

## **LESS CONVERSATION, MORE ACTION**

### **ENSURING VICTIMS OF THE RSF AND ITS INTERNATIONAL SUPPORTERS ARE NOT FORGOTTEN**



## **INTRODUCTION**

1. This report is prepared at the request of survivors of crimes committed by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and its backers in Sudan. They are asking the international community to respond to these grave violations, which the RSF continues to commit with impunity, and to respond to the role played by other States, in particular the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in directly supporting, funding, supplying or providing other assistance to the RSF whilst these crimes are ongoing and notorious.
2. In light of the deepening humanitarian catastrophe, urgent and co-ordinated action is now required to protect civilians in Sudan by ending the violence, stopping the flow of weapons into Sudan from the UAE and other countries, and re-invigorating the peace process. With the assistance of the international community, all parties to the conflict must be engaged in this process to restore national unity, security and justice.
3. Sudan has been gripped by a wave of violence for more than two years, since hostilities broke out between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the RSF in April 2023.
4. Credible evidence, based on multiple public source reports, indicate that during this conflict the RSF has committed horrific crimes against civilians, including ethnically motivated crimes against the Masalit people and others in Darfur. Reports detail waves of RSF attacks against El Geneina in 2023, where the RSF shelled civilian objects, murdered civilians, including those attempting to flee from the conflict, and committed sexual violence against women and girls. The RSF has laid siege to El Fasher since Spring 2024, attacking civilian neighbourhoods and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps, killing civilians and committing sexual violence. The same pattern of criminality is repeated across towns and villages under RSF control in Darfur and in other parts of Sudan. The resulting humanitarian catastrophe has been described by the United Nations as “*the largest and most devastating displacement, humanitarian and protection crises in the world today*”, highlighting that “*millions continued to*

*flee their homes in search of safety from extreme levels of violence and deprivation*”.<sup>1</sup> In April 2025, in his statement marking the second anniversary of the Sudanese conflict, UN Secretary-General António Guterres emphasised that *“Two years into a devastating war, Sudan remains in a crisis of staggering proportions, with civilians paying the highest price”*.<sup>2</sup>

5. The RSF’s crimes have been recognised internationally. The United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK) and other States have issued clear public statements against the RSF and its leaders. In January 2025, then-US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken declared that members of the RSF and allied militias had committed genocide in Sudan.<sup>3</sup> At the international level, there has also been robust criticism of the RSF by the UN Human Rights Council and NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, which reported that *“the RSF and their allies have committed crimes against humanity and widespread war crimes, including as part of a campaign of ethnic cleansing in Darfur”*.<sup>4</sup> Similarly, the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights have commented the situation *“condemning in the strongest terms the atrocious, deliberate and ruthless attacks by the RSF”* on internal displacement persons’ camps, recalling that these acts are *“serious violations of international humanitarian law and fundamental rights, in particular the obligations enshrined in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights”*.<sup>5</sup>
6. The atrocities, however, have continued. Credible reports uniformly confirm that the RSF continues to commit crimes in Sudan. The RSF has intensified its attacks on El Fasher, recently attacking the IDP camp at Zamzam and killing many civilians.

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<sup>1</sup> <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/114190>

<sup>2</sup> [https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2025-04-14/secretary-general%E2%80%99s-statement-the-second-anniversary-of-the-sudanese-conflict?\\_gl=1\\*2717jn\\*\\_ga\\*ODQyNTAzNzM3LjE3NTE5MDA3ODQ.\\*\\_ga\\_TK9BQL5X7Z\\*cze3NTI0ODQ4OTUkbzckZzEkdDE3NTI0ODY1NDUKajQzJGwwJGgw\\*\\_ga\\_S5EKZKSB78\\*cze3NTI0ODQ4OTUkbzEkZzEkdDE3NTI0ODY1NTckajMxJGwwJGgw](https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2025-04-14/secretary-general%E2%80%99s-statement-the-second-anniversary-of-the-sudanese-conflict?_gl=1*2717jn*_ga*ODQyNTAzNzM3LjE3NTE5MDA3ODQ.*_ga_TK9BQL5X7Z*cze3NTI0ODQ4OTUkbzckZzEkdDE3NTI0ODY1NDUKajQzJGwwJGgw*_ga_S5EKZKSB78*cze3NTI0ODQ4OTUkbzEkZzEkdDE3NTI0ODY1NTckajMxJGwwJGgw)

<sup>3</sup> <https://2021-2025.state.gov/genocide-determination-in-sudan-and-imposing-accountability-measures/>

<sup>4</sup> <https://www.hrw.org/feature/2025/04/14/sudan-conflict-2-years/des-millions-de-vies-brisees-des-dizaines-de-milliers-de>

<sup>5</sup> <https://achpr.au.int/en/news/press-releases/2025-04-16/achpr-condemns-massacre-civilians-zamzam-and-abu-shouk-camps-rapid>

7. Despite repeated statements that Sudan will not be forgotten, the level of international engagement, particularly from the US and the UK, has not kept pace with these ongoing crimes. No meaningful action followed the US State Department's declaration that the RSF committed genocide in Darfur. The most recent international efforts to resume the peace process at the London conference in April 2025 failed to deliver a realistic roadmap for peace negotiations or the protection of civilians. The clear recognition that serious international crimes have been and are being committed by the RSF in Sudan must now be matched by credible and concrete action to protect the vulnerable civilian population and hold to account those responsible for the crimes.
8. Although an arms embargo making it illegal to bring weapons into Darfur has been in force throughout the current conflict, the international investigation into those violating the embargo and the enforcement of sanctions has been inadequate. The UN Panel of Experts on Sudan identified credible evidence that the UAE was involved in supplying the RSF. Multiple public sources identify the use of supply routes from the UAE through Am Djarass airport in Chad and through Libya, and the possession and use by the RSF of military equipment and ammunition from the UAE. Amnesty International reported that "*recently manufactured or recently transferred weapons and ammunition are imported in large quantities into Sudan*", particularly noting that "*a variety of recently manufactured armoured personnel carriers from the UAE have been used by the RSF*".<sup>6</sup> The RSF also receives support from companies linked to the UAE and through gold trading. The UAE has been described as a "*major destination of gold extracted in RSF-controlled areas via Libya, Chad and South Sudan*" in a context where "*gold became more than just an economic asset; it became a central tool of power and influence*".<sup>7</sup>
9. Preventing the flow of weapons and ammunition to the RSF would significantly undermine the RSF's ability to continue committing crimes. A credible investigation should be undertaken into those responsible for financing, arming and supplying the RSF.

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<sup>6</sup> <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/07/sudan-constant-flow-of-arms-fuelling-relentless-civilian-suffering-in-conflict-new-investigation/>

<sup>7</sup> <https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/the-role-of-gold-in-the-sudanese-war-207364>

10. **This report reviews and summarises the available public source reporting about the ongoing conflict in Sudan and the widespread crimes committed by the RSF and its backers. While recognising that there are reports of violations committed by all sides to the conflict, this report focuses on the actions of the RSF and its supporters. It sets that against public responses of various international actors, including the US and the UK, who have been outspoken on the conflict with some inconsistency and little concerted action. The report then makes practical recommendations for the US and the UK, as nations at the forefront of addressing this crisis, to end the mass crimes and guarantee safety and accountability for the victims. These are of course recommendations that should be followed by all nations. It is hoped that this report will aid the pursuit of justice in Sudan.**

#### **A. THE RESUMPTION OF CONFLICT IN APRIL 2023**

11. The conflict in Sudan has a long history, but the immediate context for the present violence is that, in April 2019, following months of protests, President Al-Bashir was ousted by the military. General Abdel Fatah Al-Burhan of the SAF assumed control as the head of a transitional military council and appointed Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo of the RSF as his deputy. Attempts were made to resolve the earlier conflicts in Darfur through the Juba Peace Agreement in 2020; by mid-2021, the joint UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) completed its withdrawal.
12. A power struggle developed between the SAF and the RSF. The RSF had been formed in around 2013 from the Janjaweed militias, which were allied to the Government of Sudan and committed a range of crimes in Darfur. The RSF held a dominant position particularly in Darfur, where it controlled the gold mines and much of the territory. Both factions, and other armed groups, used the pause in hostilities recruit (often along ethnic lines) in Darfur, and to re-arm.
13. The RSF's ability to re-arm, despite the UN arms embargo covering its strongholds in Darfur, has prompted concerns that some of its international

backers are supplying and financing the RSF. The UAE, in particular, has long established links to the RSF and has a strategic interest in Sudan's ports and massive investment in Sudanese agriculture projects, on which it relies for food security.<sup>89</sup> The UAE has also been a key destination for gold traded by the RSF from Sudan, which is an important source of funding for the RSF.<sup>10</sup> \$2 billion of gold from Sudan is believed to have been imported into UAE in 2022 alone.<sup>11</sup>

14. On 15 April 2023, fighting began between the RSF and the SAF in Khartoum. The conflict rapidly spread to other parts of Sudan, notably Darfur where the RSF and allied militias seized control over much of the territory.
15. On or around 23 April 2023, the RSF began attacking the communities in al-Jabal, al-Jamarek, al-Madaress, al-Mansoura, and al-Tadhamun in and around El Geneina in West Darfur State.<sup>12</sup> El Geneina's population was predominantly Masalit and included IDP camps with tens of thousands of civilians who had fled there from earlier conflicts.
16. On 24 April 2023, following clashes between the RSF and the SAF from a nearby base, the RSF attacked Masalit neighbourhoods in El Geneina.<sup>13</sup> On 24 – 27 April 2023, the RSF used heavy artillery to shell Masalit neighbourhoods including Al Jabal and gathering sites of IDPs.<sup>14</sup>
17. In the course of this, and subsequent waves of attacks on El Geneina, the RSF targeted civilian infrastructure including hospitals, mosques, markets, water points and humanitarian premises.<sup>15</sup> There were detailed reports of violent crimes against civilians, including that 31 civilians were shot inside a government labour office, including eight women and four children.<sup>16</sup> There were also attacks on multiple IDP camps, and allegations that men in RSF

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<sup>8</sup> <https://www.khaleejtimes.com/business/uae-to-build-red-sea-port-in-sudan-in-6-billion-investment-package>

<sup>9</sup> <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/sudan-rsf-key-ally-uae-logistical-and-corporate-interests>

<sup>10</sup> <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/005/64/pdf/n2400564.pdf>, para.117-120.

<sup>11</sup> <https://adf-magazine.com/2024/08/saf-discoveries-in-omdurman-point-to-uaes-secret-support-for-rsf/>

<sup>12</sup> [https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media\\_2024/05/sudan0524web\\_0.pdf](https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2024/05/sudan0524web_0.pdf), p.31.

<sup>13</sup> <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/05/09/sudan-ethnic-cleansing-west-darfur>

<sup>14</sup> <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2024/65>, p.22.

<sup>15</sup> <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2024/65>, para.86

<sup>16</sup> [https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media\\_2024/05/sudan0524web\\_0.pdf](https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2024/05/sudan0524web_0.pdf), p.49.

uniform were shouting “*Nuba! Nuba!*” (an ethnic slur) whilst shooting at women, children and older people.<sup>17</sup>

18. On 4 May 2023, the US issued Executive Order 14098 which determined that the “*outbreak of inter-service fighting in April 2023, constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States*”.<sup>18</sup> Sanctions were imposed, including on members of the RSF.
19. On 11 May 2023, the RSF, through Omer Hamdan Ahmed Hammad, and the SAF signed the Jeddah Declaration, affirming their responsibilities to respect international humanitarian law and international human rights law.<sup>19</sup>
20. On 12 – 26 May 2023, the RSF launched a fresh wave of attacks on El Geneina, using heavy artillery in Masalit-populated neighbourhoods and camps.<sup>20</sup> Masalit neighbourhoods struck included al-Buhaira, al- Ghabat, al-Jabal, al-Jamarek, al-Madaress, al-Majliss, al-Mansoura, al-Tadhamun, al-Thawra, and al-Zuhur. Civilian centres were also targeted including al-Qadima school, al-Zahra girls boarding school,<sup>21</sup> and al-Atig mosque in al-Thawra.<sup>22</sup>
21. On 13 May 2023, 12-15 individuals, some in RSF uniform, broke into Mar Girgis (St George’s) Coptic church complex in the Bahri area of Khartoum and shot five members of the clergy, stealing large sums of money and gold cross.<sup>23</sup>
22. On 28 May 2023, Human Rights Watch reported that the RSF and allied militias attacked Misterei in West Darfur State, summarily executing 28 Masalit people and injuring others. The RSF fired on fleeing residents, causing further casualties including women and children. The town of Misterei was pillaged and burned by the attacking forces, leaving the remaining civilians to flee to Chad.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p.50.

<sup>18</sup> <https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/931716/download?inline>

<sup>19</sup> <https://2021-2025.state.gov/jeddah-declaration-of-commitment-to-protect-the-civilians-of-sudan/>

<sup>20</sup> <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2024/65>, p.22.

<sup>21</sup> [https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media\\_2024/05/sudan0524web\\_0.pdf](https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2024/05/sudan0524web_0.pdf), p.33.

<sup>22</sup> [https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media\\_2024/05/sudan0524web\\_0.pdf](https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2024/05/sudan0524web_0.pdf), p.94.

<sup>23</sup> <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr54/7037/2023/en/>, p.17.

<sup>24</sup> <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/07/11/sudan-darfur-town-destroyed>

23. **On 1 June 2023, the US imposed sanctions on companies linked to the RSF including Al Junaid and Tradive General Trading.**<sup>25</sup>
24. On 6 – 13 June 2023, the RSF launched a third wave of attacks against El Geneina, including shelling new and old gathering sites for IDPs.<sup>26</sup> In the course of these attacks on El Geneina. Reports detail how RSF fighters went door to door in Masalit neighbourhoods, looking for men and brutally attacking them,<sup>27</sup> whilst women were assaulted, raped and robbed.<sup>28</sup>
25. On 14 June 2023, the governor of West Darfur, Khamis Abakar, was killed in El Geneina, having been detained by the RSF earlier that day.<sup>29</sup>
26. In the immediate aftermath, Masalit people were displaced *en masse* from El Geneina to Adre and Ardamatta. The RSF targeted the fleeing civilians.<sup>30</sup> On 15 June 2023, the RSF opened fire on a convoy of civilians, escorted by Masalit fighters, who were trying to flee. The RSF killed men, women and children. Many drowned in the Kajja river trying to escape.<sup>31</sup> The UN Panel of Experts on Sudan received reports that 1,000 people were killed in the shooting and at least 100 drowned trying to escape.<sup>32</sup>
27. In subsequent days, the RSF and allied militias continued to attack civilians fleeing along the road from El Geneina to Chad.<sup>33</sup>
28. **On 16 July 2023, the UK imposed sanctions on companies linked to or controlled by the RSF including Al Junaid, GSK Advance Company Ltd and Tradive General Trading Company.**<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/usa-imposes-sanctions-to-promote-accountability-in-sudan>

<sup>26</sup> <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2024/65>, p.22.

<sup>27</sup> <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session57/A-HRC-57-CRP-6-en.pdf>, para.158.

<sup>28</sup> <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session57/A-HRC-57-CRP-6-en.pdf>, para.159.

<sup>29</sup> <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/east-africa-the-horn-and-great-lakes/sudan/report-sudan/>

<sup>30</sup> <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2024/65>, p.22.

<sup>31</sup> <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/05/09/sudan-ethnic-cleansing-west-darfur>

<sup>32</sup> <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2024/65>, paras.92-93.

<sup>33</sup> <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session57/A-HRC-57-CRP-6-en.pdf>, para.160.

<sup>34</sup> <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/uk-sanctions-slap-sudans-six-companies>



29. **On 4 August 2023, the US State Department stated publicly that the US joined the UK and Norway in condemning in the strongest terms the ongoing violence in Darfur.**<sup>35</sup>
30. **On 6 September 2023, the US imposed sanctions on Abdul Rahman Juma and Abdelrahim Hamdan Dagalo of the RSF because it concluded that the RSF had committed ethnically motivated killings, targeted abuses against human rights activists and defenders, conflict-related sexual violence, and looting and burning of communities in Darfur.**<sup>36</sup>
31. On 29 September 2023, The New York Times reported that the UAE was running a covert operation to supply powerful weapons and drones to the RSF, including planes from the UAE landing on a near-daily basis at Am Djarass airfield in Chad. The same cargo planes which were identified as landing at Am Djarass had previously been used by the UAE to supply other conflict zones.<sup>37</sup> Whilst the UAE said that the flights were humanitarian and it was establishing a field hospital, the number of flights and the level of development at the airfield far exceed the needs of the small hospital established by the UAE.<sup>38</sup>
32. On 11 October 2023, the UN Human Rights Council established an independent international fact-finding mission to investigate, inter alia, the facts, circumstances and root causes of alleged violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the Sudan.<sup>39</sup>
33. On 31 October 2023, the RSF took over the SAF base at Zalingei, violently displacing 16,250 IDPs from Hasahisa camp and raping dozens of women.<sup>40</sup>
34. In November 2023, the RSF escalated its abuses in El Geneina again, attacking Masalit people who had found refuge in the suburb of Ardamata. The RSF arbitrarily detained and tortured adults and children.<sup>41</sup> After homes and other

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<sup>35</sup> <https://2021-2025.state.gov/statement-on-atrocities-in-darfur-sudan/>

<sup>36</sup> <https://2021-2025.state.gov/actions-against-senior-rapid-support-forces-commanders-in-sudan/>

<sup>37</sup> <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/29/world/africa/sudan-war-united-arab-emirates-chad.html#>

<sup>38</sup> <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/09/09/fanning-flames>

<sup>39</sup> <https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/RES/54/2>

<sup>40</sup> <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2024/65>, para.58.

<sup>41</sup> <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2024/65>, para.100.

civilian buildings had been looted, the Masalit neighbourhoods were burned to the ground.<sup>42</sup>

35. Estimates indicate that the RSF killed around 800 – 2,000 people in the course of the attack on Ardamata.<sup>43</sup> Some witnesses reported that men were gathered by the RSF in Tirsana Square and summarily executed.<sup>44</sup> Others report RSF soldiers executing young men. Bodies found afterwards included an 18-month-old baby alongside five women in a residential house.<sup>45</sup>

**36. In December 2023, the US State Department concluded that the RSF had committed war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing in Darfur.<sup>46</sup>**

37. On 31 December 2023, the RSF attacked the town of Habila in South Kordofan, which had a predominantly Nuba population. Human Rights Watch reported that between December 2023 and March 2024, the RSF and allied militias carried out numerous abuses against civilians including the killing of 56 unarmed people including 11 women and a child.<sup>47</sup>

38. On 1 January 2024, the RSF attacked Fayu (South Kordofan), killing at least 21 civilians, abducting at least 18 women and girls and looting or destroying civilian property. One woman who later returned to her property reported that there was nothing left – that their furniture, clothes and even the door of the house had been looted.<sup>48</sup>

39. Human Rights Watch also documented numerous cases of rape and sexual slavery committed by the RSF during the violence in Habila and Fayu.<sup>49</sup> These included the rape of 79 women and girls. Human Rights Watch obtained satellite images showing that corrugated metal rooftops had been removed from Habila,

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<sup>42</sup> <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/05/09/sudan-ethnic-cleansing-west-darfur>

<sup>43</sup> <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2024/65>, para.100.

<sup>44</sup> <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session57/A-HRC-57-CRP-6-en.pdf>, para.162.

<sup>45</sup> <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/11/sudan-civilians-suffering-unimaginable-horror-amid-ethnically-motivated-violence-in-darfur/>

<sup>46</sup> <https://2021-2025.state.gov/genocide-determination-in-sudan-and-imposing-accountability-measures/>

<sup>47</sup> <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/12/10/sudan-war-crimes-south-kordofan>

<sup>48</sup> <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/12/10/sudan-war-crimes-south-kordofan>

<sup>49</sup> <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/12/15/sudan-fighters-rape-women-and-girls-hold-sex-slaves>

and the town had become overgrown with vegetation as though it was a ghost town.

40. In January 2024, the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies reported that 47 detainees held by the RSF had been released. Several reported having been tortured and abused in RSF custody including being beaten with water pipes, forced to stand in the sun for hours, verbally abused, threatened with sexual abuse, denied meals, and held in facilities without ventilation or toilets.<sup>50</sup>
41. On 15 January 2024, the UN Panel of Experts on Sudan sent its annual report to the Security Council. It concluded that as the RSF advanced, violence against civilians swept through Darfur, highlighting the targeting of the Masalit community in El Geneina, Sirba, Murne and Masteri in particular. In El Geneina alone, it found that 10,000 – 15,000 people had been killed by the RSF. It concluded that the RSF and allied militias systematically violated international humanitarian law, and that some of these violations may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity.<sup>51</sup> Widespread sexual violence committed by members of the RSF and allied militias were reported in all areas under RSF control.<sup>52</sup>
42. Although a UN Security Council arms embargo remained in place for Sudan, the Panel of Experts assessed that there was credible evidence that the RSF was resupplied through Am Djarass airport in Chad, with the support of the UAE and Chad.<sup>53</sup> The Panel noted that from July 2023, the RSF had been able to secure new supply lines and deploy heavy and/or sophisticated weapons which it had not used in Darfur previously.<sup>54</sup> Sources told the Experts that, several times every week, weapons and ammunition shipments were unloaded at Am Djarass airport, then loaded onto trucks before crossing the Darfur border in small convoys at Bao or Kariari.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> <https://www.acjps.org/publications/sudan-war-update-forty-seven-detainees-released-hundreds-remain-in-custody>

<sup>51</sup> <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2024/65>, summary, p.2.

<sup>52</sup> <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2024/65>, para.66.

<sup>53</sup> <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2024/65>, paras.41-42.

<sup>54</sup> <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/005/64/pdf/n2400564.pdf>, paras.39-40.

<sup>55</sup> <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/005/64/pdf/n2400564.pdf>, para.42.

43. On 22 January 2024, the EU passed Regulation 2024/384, imposing sanctions *inter alia* on three companies linked to the RSF.<sup>56</sup> The Regulation noted that Al Junaid Multi Activities Co Ltd, which was controlled by RSF commanders and covered a large part of Sudan's gold industry, generated substantial revenue for the RSF which was used to "*secure military support from the UAE, to which most of Sudan's gold production is smuggled*". A second company controlled by the RSF, Tradive General Trading Company, was also sanctioned. Tradive General Trading Company is based in the UAE and imported more than 1,000 vehicles into Sudan for the RSF, including highly mobile pick-up trucks which can be used as armed desert vehicles.
44. In or around March 2024, when capturing parts of Omdurman from the RSF, the SAF reported finding four passports belonging to UAE residents alongside weapons. Although the UAE has issued denials, there are allegations that the passports belonged to UAE intelligence officers.<sup>57</sup>
45. On 30 March 2024, the RSF attacked several villages West of Sukkar, in Senna locality, killing at least 29 people and injuring 16 others.<sup>58</sup>
46. Observers affiliated with the Sudanese Group for Victims of Enforced Disappearance prepared a report which concluded that in the first year of the conflict (April 2023 – April 2024) there were documented reports of 1,140 victims of enforced disappearance.<sup>59</sup> The report also noted that the RSF was operating at least 24 clandestine detention centres.
47. In April 2024, the Raoul Wallenberg Centre published a report on breaches of the Genocide Convention in Darfur, which concluded that the UAE was complicit in genocide in Darfur through its "*longstanding, direct, ongoing, and significant military, economic, and political support of the RSF*". It further concluded that the UAE was covering for the RSF by "*signalling a commitment to a peace process, while covertly fuelling the violence*".<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L\\_202400384](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202400384)

<sup>57</sup> <https://adf-magazine.com/2024/08/saf-discoveries-in-omdurman-point-to-uaes-secret-support-for-rsf/>

<sup>58</sup> <https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/58/29>, para.32

<sup>59</sup> [https://files.cdn-files-a.com/uploads/7315212/normal\\_662cbf4c560d2.pdf](https://files.cdn-files-a.com/uploads/7315212/normal_662cbf4c560d2.pdf)

<sup>60</sup> <https://www.raoulwallenbergcentre.org/images/reports/International-Inquiry-Breaches-of-the-Genocide-Convention.pdf>, p.47.

48. In April - May 2024, the RSF began besieging El Fasher.<sup>61</sup> El Fasher is the capital of North Darfur and is the only city in Darfur which is not controlled by the RSF. It had a population of around 1.5 million people, which is swelled by a number of IDP camps close to El Fasher, including Zamzam.
49. On 9 May 2024, Human Rights Watch released a report documenting that attacks by the RSF from April – November 2023 in El Geneina (capital of West Darfur State) had killed thousands of people and left hundreds of thousands as refugees.<sup>62</sup> The victims were Masalit people and other non-Arab communities.
50. **On 15 May 2024, the US imposed further sanctions on Ali Yagoub Gibril and Osman Mohamed Hamid Mohamed of the RSF, noting that the RSF's military operation to encircle and besiege El Fasher endangered the lives of hundreds of thousands of civilians.**<sup>63</sup>
51. On 21 May 2014, Alice Wairimu Nderita, Under-Secretary-General and Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, stated that the situation in Darfur *“bears all the marks of risk of genocide, with strong allegations that this crime has already been committed”*.<sup>64</sup>
52. In June 2024, in Gezira State, over 100 civilians were reportedly killed in an attack by the RSF on Wad al-Noura village.<sup>65</sup> It is reported that the RSF used wide-area effect attacks such as artillery shells, before fighters stormed the village using machine guns, automatic rifles and other weapons.<sup>66</sup>
53. Following the RSF's takeover of Sinja (Sennar State) in June 2024, human rights groups reported systematic gang rapes where were abducted and transferred to unknown locations.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2025/4/3/hungry-scared-darfur-civilians-fear-rsf-attack-plead-for-army-help> ; <https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/58/29>, para. 10.

<sup>62</sup> <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/05/09/sudan-ethnic-cleansing-west-darfur>

<sup>63</sup> <https://2021-2025.state.gov/sanctioning-sudanese-rapid-support-forces-commanders/>

<sup>64</sup> <https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15702.doc.htm#:~:text=Alice%20Wairimu%20Nderitu%2C%20Under%2DSecretary,has%20already%20been%20committed.%E2%80%9D%20Civilian>

<sup>65</sup> <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/6/6/up-to-100-killed-in-rsf-attack-on-sudan-village-activists>

<sup>66</sup> <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session57/A-HRC-57-CRP-6-en.pdf>, para. 135.

<sup>67</sup> <https://sihanet.org/submission-by-the-strategic-initiative-for-women-in-the-horn-of-africa-to-the-the-united-nations-human-rights-council-on-the-escalating-conflict-related-sexual-violence-in-sudan-and-the-urgent-need-fo/>

54. In July 2024, Amnesty International issued a report which identified that recently manufactured military equipment from Russia, China, Turkey and the UAE was being smuggled into Darfur. The report identified that the RSF had used recently manufactured armed personnel carriers from the UAE.<sup>68</sup>
55. On 3 August 2024, the RSF blocked trucks carrying critical medical supplies in Kabkabiya, North Darfur State, for over a month.<sup>69</sup>
56. On 15 August 2024, the RSF attacked Jalagani village in Sennar State, killing over 80 people, including 24 women and children and injuring many others.<sup>70</sup>
57. From 16 – 24 August 2024, the US and Saudi Arabia jointly organised talks in Geneva which were supported by the UN, the African Union and States including Egypt and the UAE. However, the SAF would not participate in the talks in part because of the involvement of the UAE as an observer.<sup>71</sup> The absence of the SAF was cited by the US as one reason for the failure of the talks to make more substantial progress towards resolving the conflict.<sup>72</sup>
58. On 12 September 2024, UNESCO issued a public statement that the threat of looting of Sudan’s cultural heritage had reached “*an unprecedented level*”, with reports of looting of museums, archaeological sites and private collections.<sup>73</sup> There were also widespread reports of the RSF pillaging and looting civilians in areas under RSF control, including taking cars, money, clothes, furniture, household appliances and gas cylinders.<sup>74</sup>
- 59. On 18 September 2024, the UK Permanent Representative to the UN strongly condemned the RSF assault on El Fasher, sending a clear message to the warring parties that “*we are watching closely*”.**

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<sup>68</sup> <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2024/07/new-weapons-fuelling-the-sudan-conflict/>

<sup>69</sup> <https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/58/29>, para. 74.

<sup>70</sup> <https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/58/29>, para. 32.

<sup>71</sup> <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/239>, para. 80.

<sup>72</sup> <https://geneva.usmission.gov/2024/08/23/joint-statement-from-the-alps-group-regarding-talks-in-switzerland-and-progress-in-addressing-the-crisis-in-sudan/#:~:text=Responding%20to%20the%20demand%20of,August%2014%2C%202024%2C%20with%20the>

<sup>73</sup> <https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/sudan-unesco-raises-alarm-reports-illicit-trafficking-cultural-heritage?hub=701>

<sup>74</sup> <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session57/A-HRC-57-CRP-6-en.pdf>, para. 147.

60. On 29 September 2024, The New York Times reported that the UAE was fuelling the conflict in Sudan by providing arms and medical treatment to the RSF.<sup>75</sup>
61. **On 8 October 2024, the US imposed sanctions on Algony Hamdan Daglo Musa of the RSF, noting “*brutal RSF atrocities against civilians*” and that, in spite of warnings from the US and others, the RSF “*continued to commit atrocities, including those involving sexual violence and ethnically targeted attacks on non-Arab groups*”.**<sup>76</sup>
62. On 15 October 2024, The Washington Post reported that drones and munitions captured by the SAF in Omdurman appeared to be manufactured in Serbia and sent to the UAE.<sup>77</sup> The report cited the Sudan Conflict Observatory’s assessment that 32 tracked flights from the UAE in the period June 2023 – May 2024 were with “*near certainty*” weapons transfers to the RSF.
63. On 21 October 2024, recognising the situation in Sudan as the world’s largest displacement crisis and the widespread and systematic conflict-related sexual violence, the UN Secretary General made recommendations for the protection of civilians in Sudan including: intensifying diplomatic efforts towards a sustainable resolution of the conflict; urging all parties including the RSF to establish a compliance mechanism to ensure humanitarian commitments are followed on the ground; facilitating access for international and regional investigative bodies; and supporting credible domestic accountability mechanisms.<sup>78</sup>
64. On 20 October 2024, Abu Agla Keikel defected from the RSF to the SAF. The RSF responded by unleashing a wave of retaliatory attacks against more than 30 villages and towns in Gezira State including Rufaa, Tamboul, al-Sireha and Azrag. Crimes were committed against civilians in the course of these attacks. On 22 October 2024, RSF fighters shouted at civilians to leave and searched for

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<sup>75</sup> <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/29/world/africa/sudan-war-united-arab-emirates-chad.html>

<sup>76</sup> <https://2021-2025.state.gov/imposing-sanctions-on-sudanese-senior-rapid-support-forces-leader/>

<sup>77</sup> <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/10/15/sudan-war-weapons-uae-iran/>

<sup>78</sup> <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4065051?ln=en&v=pdf>, paras.5-6, 40-53.

any relatives of Keikel. On 25 and 26 October 2024, the RSF attacked al-Sireha, killing 124 civilians, detaining around 150 civilians and injuring 200.<sup>79</sup>

65. As part of the RSF's attack, the Strategic Institute for Women in the Horn of Africa documented 44 cases of conflict-related sexual violence in Gezira State between 21 October and 8 November 2024, including the gang rape of girls, and sexual enslavement.<sup>80</sup>

66. On 23 October 2024, the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission reported that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the RSF and allied militias have committed: the war crimes of murder, mutilation, cruel treatment, torture, rape, sexual slavery, pillage, conscripting children, direct attacks against the civilian population and ordering the displacement of the civilian population; the crimes against humanity of murder, torture, enslavement, rape, sexual slavery, acts of a sexual nature of comparable gravity, persecution, and forcible displacement. It also found reasonable grounds to believe that the SAF committed war crimes including murder, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture, and committing outrages upon personal dignity.<sup>81</sup>

67. On 8 November 2024, following a proposal from the US, the UN Security Council Sudan Sanctions Committee added Osman Mohamed Hamid Mohamed and Abdel Rahman Joma Barakallah, both senior RSF commanders, to the sanctions list on Darfur.<sup>82</sup>

**68. Following the UN designation, on 11 November 2024, the UK imposed sanctions on Osman Mohamed Hamid Mohamed and Abdel Rahman Joma Barakallah.<sup>83</sup> These remain the only individuals added to the UK Sanctions list regarding Sudan since the conflict reignited in April 2023. On 12**

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<sup>79</sup> <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/11/10/sudan-rapid-support-forces-target-civilians>

<sup>80</sup> <https://sihanet.org/submission-by-the-strategic-initiative-for-women-in-the-horn-of-africa-to-the-the-united-nations-human-rights-council-on-the-escalating-conflict-related-sexual-violence-in-sudan-and-the-urgent-need-to/>

<sup>81</sup> <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session57/A-HRC-57-CRP-6-en.pdf>, paras.290, 291-294.

<sup>82</sup> <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/11/14/sudan-un-acts-abusive-commanders>

<sup>83</sup> <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/67321b030d90eee304badb5b/sanctionsconlist.pdf> ; <https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/58/29>, para.33.



**November 2024, the US also imposed sanctions on Abdel Rahman Joma Barakallah of the RSF.<sup>84</sup>**

69. On 14 November 2024, Amnesty International identified that the RSF had used Nimr Ajban armoured personnel carriers manufactured in the UAE, and equipped with the Galix system, made by Lacroix Defense, a French company with an established presence in the UAE.<sup>85</sup>

**70. On 17 November 2024, the UK announced a major aid increase to Sudan and used the UK's Presidency of the Security Council to support a draft resolution calling for the protection of civilians and unrestricted passage of aid in Sudan.<sup>86</sup> Foreign Secretary David Lammy stated “*the UK will never forget Sudan*”. The draft resolution was blocked by Russia.**

71. On 12 December 2024, Reuters reported that during the conflict dozens of flights from the UAE had landed at Amdjarass airstrip in Chad, which is believed to be used for supplying weapons and munition to the RSF.<sup>87</sup>

72. In December 2024, three siblings aged 3 to 12 were abducted by the RSF whilst collecting wild fruit in Sibli village, South Kordofan. They were detained for six days and raped, before being released after local mediation efforts.<sup>88</sup>

73. On 16 December 2024, the EU added four people to its sanctions list, including Tijani Karshoum, the new RSF-affiliated governor of West Darfur, and Osman Hamid, the RSF's operations chief.<sup>89</sup> Two officials linked to intelligence in the SAF were also sanctioned.

74. On 19 December 2024, the White House wrote to Senator Chris Van Hollen and Representative Sara Jacobs regarding legislation designed to prevent arms sales to the UAE. It stated that “*Despite reports we have received suggesting the*

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<sup>84</sup> <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2710>

<sup>85</sup> <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/11/sudan-french-manufactured-weapons-system-identified-in-conflict-new-investigation/>

<sup>86</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-doubles-aid-for-sudan-and-neighbouring-countries-facing-the-worst-humanitarian-crisis-of-the-decade>

<sup>87</sup> <https://www.reuters.com/world/uae-flights-flood-airstrip-un-says-supplies-weapons-sudan-rebels-2024-12-12/>

<sup>88</sup> <https://sihanet.org/press-statement-caught-in-the-crossfire-the-hidden-toll-of-sudans-conflict-on-children/>

<sup>89</sup> <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/senior-sudan-officials-latest-hit-by-eu-sanctions>

*contrary has occurred to date, the UAE has informed the Administration that it is not now transferring any weapons to the RSF and will not do so going forward*".<sup>90</sup> The UAE's assurance that it "*is not now*" transferring weapons to the RSF is a tacit acknowledgement that it has previously armed the RSF.

## **B. THE US DETERMINATION THAT THE RSF COMMITTED GENOCIDE**

**75. On 7 January 2025, the US State Department declared that the RSF had committed genocide in Darfur. The basis for this determination was that** *"[t]he RSF and allied militias have systematically murdered men and boys—even infants—on an ethnic basis, and deliberately targeted women and girls from certain ethnic groups for rape and other forms of brutal sexual violence. Those same militias have targeted fleeing civilians, murdering innocent people escaping conflict, and prevented remaining civilians from accessing lifesaving supplies"*.<sup>91</sup>

**76. At the same time, the US imposed sanctions on Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo and seven companies linked to the RSF, which were said to be based in the UAE although the UAE has denied that the companies held valid trading licenses.**<sup>92</sup>

**77. On 13 January 2025, responding to a question about the US determination of genocide, the UK Minister for Development stated that** *"the long-standing position of successive British Governments is that it is for the courts to decide whether genocide has occurred"*. Nonetheless, the Minister condemned the crimes in Sudan in the strongest possible terms and stated that *"[i]rrespective of any genocide determination, it is clear that atrocities have been committed in this conflict and that those responsible must be held to account"*.<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> <https://www.vanhollen.senate.gov/news/press-releases/van-hollen-jacobs-announce-administration-has-received-assurances-from-uae-will-monitor-compliance-in-response-to-the-lawmakers-push-on-us-uae-weapons-sale-and-uae-support-for-rsf-in-sudan>

<sup>91</sup> <https://2021-2025.state.gov/genocide-determination-in-sudan-and-imposing-accountability-measures/>

<sup>92</sup> <https://sudantribune.com/article299377/>

<sup>93</sup> <https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2025-01-13/debates/04E7EF33-0D16-49E5-B444-2BB5D59B898B/SudanUSDeterminationOfGenocide>

78. On 15 January 2025, during his confirmation hearing before Congress, Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated in relation to the situation in Sudan that “*by its very definition, this is a real genocide*”. He continued that in the course of pragmatic engagement with the UAE, “*we need the raise the fact that they are openly supporting an entity that is carrying out a genocide*”.<sup>94</sup>
79. The determination that the RSF has committed genocide has legal and political consequences. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948 provides at Article 1 that the Contracting Parties “*undertake to prevent and to punish*” the crime of genocide. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has held that Article 1 imposes on Contracting Parties a direct and separate obligation to prevent genocide.<sup>95</sup> The content of the obligation requires Contracting Parties to “*employ all means reasonable available to them so as to prevent genocide so far as possible*”.<sup>96</sup> The precise scope of the action that Contracting Parties are required to take will vary with the circumstances and, in particular, upon the capacity of the State in question to influence effectively the actions of the persons committing or about to commit genocide.<sup>97</sup> Both the US and the UK are parties to the Genocide Convention and are therefore required to take reasonable steps, within their capacity to influence, to prevent genocide from being committed in Darfur.
80. In addition to these legal consequences, the declaration that genocide has been committed in Darfur should be a watershed moment politically, associating the RSF’s backers with genocide. It also imposes a moral imperative that the survivors of these crimes must be protected, and those responsible held to account through an independent mechanism.

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<sup>94</sup> <https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/6df93f4b-a83c-89ac-0fac-9b586715afd8/01%2015%2025%20Nominations%20--%20Rubio.pdf>

<sup>95</sup> ICJ, *Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro)*, Judgment, 26 February 2007, paras.162 and 427, <https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/91/091-20070226-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf>

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, para.430.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*

## C. THE AFTERMATH OF THE GENOCIDE DETERMINATION

80. On 20 January 2025, the RSF issued an ultimatum to opposing forces to leave El Fasher. The UN Human Rights Office expressed deep concern for the citizens of El Fasher in the light of the likely imminent attack by RSF.<sup>98</sup>
81. On 20 January 2025, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights documented 120 incidents of conflict-related sexual violence involving 203 victims, the majority of which were attributed to the RSF.<sup>99</sup> He noted these figures are likely to be vastly under-reported due to social stigma, the fear of reprisals and the collapse of medical and judicial systems. In West Darfur State, allegations of sexual violence were often linked to ethnically motivated attacks by the RSF against the Masalit peoples.<sup>100</sup> The High Commissioner also noted that there was a sharp increase in disappearances in areas controlled by the RSF including Al-Gazira, Central Darfur, Khartoum, Senna and West Darfur States.<sup>101</sup>
82. **On 25 January 2025, UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy visited the border crossing at Adre in Chad and spoke to refugees fleeing Darfur. He announced a further increase in aid spending, indicated a plan to convene a meeting of foreign ministers to work towards ending the conflict and said, again, that “the UK will not let Sudan be forgotten”.<sup>102</sup>**
83. On 25 January 2025, the RSF attacked Borush village (around 100 miles East of El Fasher) and killed at least 80 people.<sup>103</sup>
84. **On 28 January 2025, UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy condemned in the strongest possible terms the RSF attacks on Zamzam IDP camp and the last functioning hospital in El Fasher. He further described the situation in Darfur as one of the biggest humanitarian catastrophes of our lifetime.<sup>104</sup>**

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<sup>98</sup> <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/01/sudan-concern-civilians-over-likely-offensive-el-fasher>

<sup>99</sup> <https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/58/29>, para.48.

<sup>100</sup> <https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/58/29>, para.51.

<sup>101</sup> <https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/58/29>, para.61.

<sup>102</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/sudan-must-not-be-forgotten-david-lammy-announces-political-and-humanitarian-action-to-address-catastrophe-in-sudan>

<sup>103</sup> <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2025/2/3/as-the-rsf-surrounds-darfurs-el-fasher-ethnic-killings-feared>

<sup>104</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/sudan-and-eastern-drc-foreign-secretarys-statement>

85. On 28 January 2025, the Prosecutor of the ICC updated the UN Security Council that “*international crimes are undoubtedly being committed in Darfur*”, expressing particular concern about the stream of allegations of crimes targeting women and girls.<sup>105</sup> The Office of Prosecutor set an objective to submit multiple applications for warrants of arrest in relation to crimes committed since April 2023.<sup>106</sup>
86. On 1 February 2025, an RSF explosive hit a market in Omdurman (Khartoum state), killing around 54 people and injuring 158.<sup>107</sup>
87. On 2 February 2025, the Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa documented seven cases of girls aged between six and 15 who were held by the RSF in a detention centre in al-Zamalek neighbourhood of al Gezira and forced to serve RSF members.<sup>108</sup>
88. On 11 February 2025, the RSF attacked Zamzam IDP camp, striking the Eastern side of the camp with artillery shelling and small arms fire. During the attacks, the RSF set fire to the main Eastern market, killed and arrested numerous residents and looted vehicles and other property. On 13 February 2025, the RSF attacked the camp again and fighting took place against some militia loyal to the SAF.<sup>109</sup>
89. In mid-February 2025, the RSF attacked villages in al-Kaderis and al-Khelwat in the White Nile State. Reports indicated that at least 200 civilians were killed.<sup>110</sup>
90. On or around 22 February 2025, the RSF and its allies signed a charter in Kenya purporting to establishing a separate governing authority in areas under its control, including much of Darfur.<sup>111</sup> Members of the UN Security Council

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<sup>105</sup> <https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-karim-aa-khan-kc-united-nations-security-council-situation-darfur>

<sup>106</sup> <https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/2025-01/2025-01-27-otp-40th-unscc-report-darfur-eng.pdf>, para.53.

<sup>107</sup> <https://www.msf.org/sudan-msf-condemns-omdurman-market-attack>

<sup>108</sup> <https://sihanet.org/press-statement-caught-in-the-crossfire-the-hidden-toll-of-sudans-conflict-on-children/>

<sup>109</sup> <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/02/sudan-rsf-must-stop-attacks-on-famine-stricken-zamzam-camp/>; <https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/urgent-alert-on-the-risk-of-genocide-in-north-darfur-sudan/>

<sup>110</sup> <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c0rzw8wqn8vo>

<sup>111</sup> <https://www.voanews.com/a/un-voices-concern-over-sudan-paramilitary-charter/7989433.html>

expressed concern and disapproval of this development.<sup>112</sup> The RSF has claimed to have plans to establish its own currency and passports in the areas under its control.<sup>113</sup>

91. On 26 February 2025, senior UN humanitarian officials warned that the catastrophic situation in Sudan had worsened in recent weeks, noting that violence in and around the Zamzam camp had forced agencies including Medecins Sans Frontieres to suspend activities.<sup>114</sup> Zamzam camp hosted around 500,000 people. MSF had to withdraw in the wake of RSF launching direct attacks on the camp on 11 and 12 February 2025.<sup>115</sup>

92. On 2 March 2025, it was reported that the RSF had attacked dozens of villages in the South-Eastern part of El Fasher, displacing thousands of civilians towards the Zamzam IDP camp.<sup>116</sup>

93. On 5 March 2025, Sudan instituted proceedings against the UAE at the ICJ, alleging that the UAE has violated the Genocide Convention through its support of the RSF.<sup>117</sup> Sudan's applications alleges that the RSF has committed genocide against the Masalit in Darfur.<sup>118</sup>

94. On 11 March 2025, the EU re-iterated its commitment to the unity and territorial integrity of Sudan and stated publicly that the RSF's plans for a parallel government would "*risk the partition of the country and jeopardise the democratic aspirations of the Sudanese people*".<sup>119</sup>

95. On 12 March 2025, it was reported that ten civilians were killed by RSF shelling in North Darfur State, including five children.<sup>120</sup>

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<sup>112</sup> <https://www.voanews.com/a/un-voices-concern-over-sudan-paramilitary-charter/7989433.html>

<sup>113</sup> [https://sudantribune.com/article298217/#google\\_vignette](https://sudantribune.com/article298217/#google_vignette)

<sup>114</sup> <https://press.un.org/en/2025/sc16008.doc.htm>

<sup>115</sup> <https://msf.org.au/article/project-news/sudan-violence-engulfs-zamzam-camp-msf-forced-halt-activities#:~:text=MSF%20is%20deeply%20concerned%20about,able%20to%20do%20so%20unharmd.>

<sup>116</sup> <https://sudantribune.com/article298067/>

<sup>117</sup> <https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/2025-01/2025-01-27-otp-40th-unscc-report-darfur-eng.pdf>

<sup>118</sup> <https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/2025-01/2025-01-27-otp-40th-unscc-report-darfur-eng.pdf>, para.7.

<sup>119</sup> [https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/sudan-statement-spokesperson-latest-political-developments\\_en](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/sudan-statement-spokesperson-latest-political-developments_en)

<sup>120</sup> <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/10-civilians-killed-in-paramilitary-rsf-shelling-in-sudan-s-darfur-army-says/3507799>; <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudanese-armed-forces-5-children-among-10-dead-in-north-darfur-shelling>

96. On 15 March 2025, it was reported that the number of victims of enforced disappearance during the conflict had reached 2,000.<sup>121</sup>
97. On 25 March 2025, Reuters reported that the RSF was squeezing aid supplies, by demanding higher fees and oversight of the operational processes of aid groups.<sup>122</sup>
98. On 26 March 2025, UNICEF called for urgent protection of children and unimpeded humanitarian access to Darfur, noting that 70 children had been killed or maimed in El Fasher in the first quarter of 2025.<sup>123</sup> UNICEF highlighted the shelling of the Zamzam IDP camp in relation to these deaths.
99. In late March 2025, the SAF reclaimed control of Khartoum. The Republican Palace was reclaimed from the RSF on or around 21 March 2025.<sup>124</sup> Key bridges were captured on 26 and 28 March 2025 and the SAF has declared control over the capital.<sup>125</sup>
100. The SAF has claimed that it has uncovered evidence of serious crimes committed by the RSF in and around Khartoum, including mass graves and torture in RSF detention centres. Some reports suggest that the SAF liberated as many as 4,000 prisoners from RSF detention centres in and around Khartoum.<sup>126</sup> The SAF has also claimed that the RSF targeted museums, libraries, universities and historic mosques and churches in Khartoum; the National Museum was looted of all but one artefact whilst under the control of the RSF.<sup>127</sup> The SAF sought co-operation from UNESCO and Interpol to hold those responsible for looting to account.

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<sup>121</sup> <https://sudantribune.com/article298621/>

<sup>122</sup> <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudans-rsf-squeezing-relief-supplies-famine-spreads-aid-workers-say-2025-03-25/>

<sup>123</sup> <https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/825000-children-trapped-conflict-rages-sudans-al-fasher-and-zamzam-internally>

<sup>124</sup> <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/major-breakthrough-as-sudan-army-retakes-republican-palace>

<sup>125</sup> <https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/sudan-army-takes-control-of-khartoum-rsf-remains-defiant>

<sup>126</sup> <https://sudantribune.com/article299200/>

<sup>127</sup> <https://sudantribune.com/article299250/>

101. Although the RSF has confirmed its withdrawal from Khartoum, its leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo has said that the war is not over and the RSF will return stronger, more powerful and victorious.<sup>128</sup><sup>129</sup> He has been reported as saying that the war remains “*in its infancy*”.<sup>130</sup> Abdel Rahim Hamdan Dagalo, deputy-commander of RSF, is also reported to have threatened to broaden the conflict by attacking Northern State and River Nile State to the North of Sudan.<sup>131</sup>
102. On 29 March 2025, the Sudan Tribune quoted the Sudanese Group for Defending Rights and Freedoms as saying that it had documented the disappearance of 50,000 people during the two years of the conflict.<sup>132</sup>
103. On 31 March 2025, the RSF shelled Abu Shouk IDP camp in El Fasher.<sup>133</sup> It was reported that seven people were killed and nine were injured.<sup>134</sup>
104. On 31 March 2025, it was reported that the Central African Republic planned to allow the UAE access to an airfield in Birao, close to the border with Sudan, which could be used for resupplying the RSF.<sup>135</sup>
105. On 1 April 2025, it was reported that RSF shelling had killed nine civilians in El Fasher.<sup>136</sup>
106. On 6 April 2025, it was reported that 15 civilians were killed in ongoing clashes between the RSF and SAF in Omdurman, as fighting continued around the remaining RSF strongholds in the area.<sup>137</sup> Amid ongoing fighting around El Fasher, it was reported that the RSF again shelled Zamzam IDP camp.<sup>138</sup>

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<sup>128</sup> <https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250330-rsf-paramilitary-chief-admits-forces-withdrew-from-sudan-capital>

<sup>129</sup> <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudans-paramilitary-rsf-chief-says-war-with-army-is-not-over-2025-03-30/>

<sup>130</sup> [https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/hemedti-acknowledges-rsf-retreat-after-sudan-army-gains#google\\_vignette](https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/hemedti-acknowledges-rsf-retreat-after-sudan-army-gains#google_vignette)

<sup>131</sup> <https://sudantribune.com/article299288/>

<sup>132</sup> <https://sudantribune.com/article299200/>

<sup>133</sup> <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/renewed-deadly-rsf-shelling-strikes-north-darfur-camp>

<sup>134</sup> <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/renewed-deadly-rsf-shelling-strikes-north-darfur-camp>

<sup>135</sup> <https://www.africaintelligence.com/central-africa/2025/03/31/faustin-archange-touadera-paves-the-way-for-emirati-and-russian-military-sites,110405280-eve>

<sup>136</sup> <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/north-darfur-least-nine-dead-17-wounded-rsf-shelling>

<sup>137</sup> <https://sudantribune.com/article299431/>

<sup>138</sup> <https://sudantribune.com/article299400/>



107. On 9 April 2025, The Guardian reported that SAF had discovered mass graves and prisons in and around Khartoum after the RSF departed. The RSF arrested and mistreated civilians in Khartoum, particularly in neighbourhoods such as Arkaweet which the RSF overran. The report highlighted the case of Alwaleed Abdeen, a businessman, who was detained for six months and upon his release by the SAF was so emaciated that friends could not recognise him. He died in hospital shortly after his release. The SAF recorded other images of bodies in or around Jebel Awliya, on the road South from Khartoum, and reported that they died from hunger or thirst.<sup>139</sup>
108. On 10 April 2025, Amnesty International released a major report on sexual violence in Sudan, detailing crimes committed by the RSF against women and girls, including rape, gang-rape, sexual slavery and other sexual assaults in locations including Khartoum, Gezira, and Darfur.<sup>140</sup> All of the crimes alleged in this report were committed by members of the RSF, as identified primarily through their uniforms and the branded vehicles that they used.
109. On 11 April 2025, it was widely reported that the RSF intensified its attack on El Fasher. The RSF killed around 5 civilians in Um Kadadah, a town 180km East of El Fasher.<sup>141</sup> In the course of attacking El Fasher, the RSF has also attacked the IDP camps of Abu Shouk and Zamzam, sending a ground offensive into Zamzam. Civilians have been killed, with estimates of the deaths ranging from 100 to 320.<sup>142</sup> Nine members of staff of Relief International, including doctors, were shot, in an attack apparently directed at one of the few functioning clinics in Zamzam.<sup>143</sup> Satellite imagery analysed by Yale University confirms the ground offensive and that multiple structure inside Zamzam have been burned.<sup>144</sup> Whilst denying that it attacked civilians, the RSF has claimed to have completed a successful liberation of the camp.<sup>145</sup>

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<sup>139</sup> <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/apr/09/video-of-rescued-man-alwaleed-abdeen-horror-of-rsf-sudan-torture-camps>

<sup>140</sup> <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr54/9201/2025/en/>

<sup>141</sup> <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/4/13/sudans-rsf-claims-control-of-famine-hit-zamzam-camp-in-darfur>

<sup>142</sup> <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/apr/13/sudans-rsf-kills-civilians-in-attacks-on-darfur-refugee-camps>

<sup>143</sup> <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cg41r3w0e19o>

<sup>144</sup> <https://files-profile.medicine.yale.edu/documents/1c711637-a7c0-4e06-a03b-df4139dbbe78>

<sup>145</sup> <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cg41r3w0e19o>

110. On 14 April 2025, it was reported that a leaked report from five UN experts “documented a consistent pattern of Ilyushin Il-76TD cargo flights originating from the United Arab Emirates” into Chad, effectively establishing a new regional air bridge. Peculiarities in the flights were noted, including the flights disappearing for segments of the journey, raising questions of clandestine operations.<sup>146</sup> While the UN experts were unable to confirm the contents of the flights, there are known to be more than three land routes from Chad into Sudan which are used to bring weapons into Sudan and the behaviour of the flights, at least, raises concerns that the UAE continues to support the RSF.<sup>147</sup>
111. On 14 April 2025, the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan condemned the reported massacres at displacement camps and warned that “amid the rising tide of hate speech and ethnically driven violence and reprisals, we fear the darkest chapters of this conflict have yet to unfold”.<sup>148</sup>
112. On 15 April 2025, the UK hosted the meeting of Foreign Ministers in London “to foster consensus on a path to ending the conflict”.<sup>149</sup> The *de facto* government of Sudan, led by the SAF, was not invited to the talks and strongly criticised the UK for inviting the UAE to participate.<sup>150</sup> The talks failed even to agree on a joint communique or a set of principles to establish a future contact group.<sup>151</sup> Negotiations broke down between the UAE and Egypt / Saudia Arabia (who have backed the SAF).<sup>152</sup> The conference was described as a “*diplomatic flop*” by Laetitia Bader, Horn of Africa director at Human Rights Watch.<sup>153</sup> The final joint co-chairs statement by the UK,

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<sup>146</sup> <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/apr/14/leaked-un-experts-report-raises-fresh-concerns-over-uaes-role-in-sudan-war>

<sup>147</sup> <https://www.washingtoncentre.org/un-expert-report-expose-uaes-arms-supply-to-rsf-through-chad/>

<sup>148</sup> <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/04/sudan-un-fact-finding-mission-deplores-darfur-killings-conflict-enters-third>

<sup>149</sup> <https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2025-02-25/debates/1B4C2218-74E9-4C0A-884C-4E2DA863517F/ConflictInSudan>

<sup>150</sup> <https://www.theafricareport.com/380262/investment-in-distrust-is-the-uk-ministerial-meeting-on-sudan-doomed/>

<sup>151</sup> <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/apr/15/uk-conference-hopes-to-map-pathway-to-end-suffering-in-sudan>

<sup>152</sup> <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/london-conference-puts-paralysed-sudan-peace-efforts-display>

<sup>153</sup> <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/london-conference-sudan-diplomatic-flop-rsf-declares-parallel-government>

**France, Germany, the EU and the AU failed to refer expressly to civilian protection.<sup>154</sup>**

113. On 15 April 2025, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo announced the formation of the RSF's "*government of peace and unity*".<sup>155</sup> He announced the RSF's intention that the parallel administration will issue new currency and identity documents and provide basic services including education, health and justice.<sup>156</sup> Clearly, the "*government of peace and unity*" would function as a parallel administration, effectively partitioning Sudan.

114. On 17 April 2025, the 2024 report of the UN Panel of Experts was made public. It concluded that in El Fasher the RSF had committed "*verified patterns of rape*" as it advanced through neighbourhoods and that the RSF had attacked, pillaged and occupied civilian homes in order to take control and remove civilians.<sup>157</sup> The RSF also targeted civilian objects including markets, mosques, hospitals and clinics.<sup>158</sup> It also concluded that the RSF employed a calculated strategy to instil fear in areas under its control, including violence against IDPs and widespread sexual violence.<sup>159</sup> The Panel of Experts also highlighted the continuing flow of weapons and equipment to the RSF, including the use by the RSF of drones in El Fasher.<sup>160</sup>

115. The Panel of Experts noted supply routes for the RSF from Am Djarass in Chad to El Fasher, Omdurman and Kordofan, through an RSF logistics base at Bir Mirgui.<sup>161</sup> The Panel, however, was unable to confirm transfers of military material from Am Djarass to Darfur.

116. On 18 April 2025, France 24 published a series of investigative reports documenting that mortar shells manufactured in Bulgaria were sold to the UAE

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<sup>154</sup> <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/london-conference-sudan-diplomatic-flop-rsf-declares-parallel-government>

<sup>155</sup> <https://news.sky.com/story/sudans-paramilitary-chief-announces-rival-government-of-peace-and-unity-13349816>

<sup>156</sup> <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/hemedti-sudan-government-of-peace-and-unity-to-issue-new-currency-and-ids>

<sup>157</sup> <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/239>, paras.28 and 29.

<sup>158</sup> <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/239>, paras.32-34.

<sup>159</sup> <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/239>, paras.44-46.

<sup>160</sup> <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/239>, para.43.

<sup>161</sup> <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/239>, paras.95-98.

armed forces, through a UAE company previously linked to violations of the arms embargo in Libya, and then taken by Colombian mercenaries through Libya to the RSF in Sudan.<sup>162</sup> When they intercepted a munitions convoy in Darfur in November 2024, fighters from the Sudanese Liberation Army found a Colombian passport with an exit stamp from the UAE.<sup>163</sup>

117. On 25 April 2025, the UN expressed grave concerns over the worsening human rights situations around El Fasher as a result of the RSF offensives. The UN Human Rights Office confirmed at least 481 civilians had been killed in North Darfur since 10 April 2025, though the true figure is likely much higher. Dozens have also died due to lack of food, water and medical care either in RSF detention or while attempting to flee the violence. The High Commissioner described the civilian casualties and sexual violence as “*horrifying*”.<sup>164</sup>

118. On 25 April 2025, the Yale University Humanitarian Research Lab confirmed that six advanced unmanned aerial vehicles were visible in satellite images at Nyala Airport in Darfur, controlled by the RSF, demonstrating that the RSF continues to receive prohibited shipments including of advanced weapons systems.<sup>165</sup>

119. On 27 April 2025, it was reported that the UAE had installed a military radar near Bosaso airport in Somalia’s semi-autonomous Puntland region. The radar was installed shortly after the RSF lost control of Khartoum. It is suggested that the radar helps to facilitate the transfer of weapons, ammunition and supplies to the RSF.<sup>166</sup>

120. On 29 April 2025, it was reported that the UN Panel of Experts was investigating how mortar rounds exported from Bulgaria to the UAE had ended

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<sup>162</sup> <https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20250419-investigation-european-weapons-sudan-part-3-mercenaries-colombia>

<sup>163</sup> <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/sudan-rsf-saf-uae-intervention/>

<sup>164</sup> <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/04/sudan-turk-gravely-concerned-rising-civilian-deaths-and-widespread-sexual>

<sup>165</sup> <https://files-profile.medicine.yale.edu/documents/e3b5ad82-2fc6-4cab-886d-899467caaeae>

<sup>166</sup> <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20250427-uae-deployed-radar-to-somalias-puntland-to-defend-from-houthi-attacks-supply-sudans-rsf/>

up in an RSF supply convoy.<sup>167</sup> Bulgaria has confirmed that it did not authorise the munitions to be re-exported.

121. On 1 May 2025, the RSF shelled the presidential palace in Khartoum, in what was reported to be their second bombardment of the capital in less than a week. The artillery was fired from the al-Salha neighbourhood across the White Nile, suggesting that the RSF in adopting its closest positions to Khartoum since the SAF took control of the capital in March.<sup>168</sup>

122. On 5 May 2025, the ICJ declined to award provisional measures and removed Sudan's case against the UAE from its list. The Court was "*deeply concerned about the unfolding human tragedy*" and the "*untold loss of life and suffering*".<sup>169</sup> However, the Court found that the UAE's reservation to the Genocide Convention was formulated in clear terms and can only be interpreted as seeking to exclude the jurisdiction of the Court.<sup>170</sup> Accordingly, whilst making no findings on the merits, the Court ruled against Sudan on jurisdiction. Seven Judges dissented from the decision to remove the case from the ICJ's list on the basis that they concluded that the arguments about the scope and validity of the UAE's reservation should have been heard fully and not dismissed in the course of the provisional measures hearing.<sup>171</sup>

123. On 4 – 6 May 2025, the RSF attacked Port Sudan with drones. Port Sudan was used by the SAF as a temporary capital during the conflict and is a main stronghold for the SAF. The RSF's sustained drone attack opens a new front in the conflict. Moreover, Port Sudan has been used as a base for UN officials and aid operations, which means that the delivery of essential humanitarian aid is likely to be compromised by these attacks.<sup>172</sup> The RSF's increased capacity to

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<sup>167</sup> <https://www.reuters.com/world/un-panel-investigates-emirati-links-seized-weapons-darfur-2025-04-29/>

<sup>168</sup> [https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/05/01/sudan-rsf-paramilitary-fighters-strike-the-khartoum-presidential-palace\\_6740808\\_4.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/05/01/sudan-rsf-paramilitary-fighters-strike-the-khartoum-presidential-palace_6740808_4.html)

<sup>169</sup> ICJ, *Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in Sudan* (Sudan v UAE), Order, 5 May 2025, <https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/197/197-20250505-ord-01-00-en.pdf>, para.17.

<sup>170</sup> <https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/197/197-20250505-ord-01-00-en.pdf>, para.29.

<sup>171</sup> <https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/197/197-20250505-ord-01-02-en.pdf>  
<https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/197/197-20250505-ord-01-03-en.pdf>

<sup>172</sup> <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/explosions-heard-sudanese-city-port-sudan-reuters-witness-reports-2025-05-06/>

use drones in its combat operations in Sudan is a strong indicator of its support from the UAE.<sup>173</sup> Defence analysts have observed that either the RSF has rapidly gained the skills necessary to operate sophisticated drone technology or foreign actors are assisting the RSF in flying the missions.<sup>174</sup> The government of Sudan broke off diplomatic relations with the UAE following the Port Sudan attacks, clearly showing that it believes that the UAE is responsible for the attacks.<sup>175</sup>

124. On 8 May 2025, Amnesty International reported that there was clear evidence that the RSF was using weapons manufactured in China and re-exported by the UAE. Amnesty analysed RSF weapons seized in Khartoum and fragments from battlefields in Darfur after RSF attacks. This analysis identified that the RSF was using Chinese GB50A guided bombs and 155mm AH-4 howitzers, which were manufactured by the Norinco Group (which is owned by China). These weapons were almost certainly re-exported to the RSF by the UAE, which is the only country known to have imported AH-4 howitzers from China.<sup>176</sup>

## **D. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

125. After two years of horrific conflict, there is a broad international consensus that serious international crimes have been committed in Sudan, including by the RSF. The effect on the surviving civilian population has been catastrophic with vast numbers of people displaced and in desperate need of basic supplies such as food and medicine.

126. Despite the SAF taking back control of Khartoum, the conflict is not over. The RSF remains dominant in Darfur and has previously shown its capacity to re-group, re-arm and recruit effectively, aided and abetted by external actors including the UAE. Its public statements show that the RSF is committed to continuing the conflict. Indeed, in recent weeks, the RSF has intensified its

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<sup>173</sup> <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cg4vz0qy77no>

<sup>174</sup> <https://www.ft.com/content/5e9441c8-00d1-4133-87d6-a026deb6eb39>

<sup>175</sup> <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/may/06/sudan-to-cut-ties-with-united-arab-emirates-over-alleged-rsf-support>

<sup>176</sup> <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/05/sudan-advanced-chinese-weaponry-provided-by-uae-identified-in-breach-of-arms-embargo-new-investigation/>

attacks on El Fasher and surrounding IDPs and towns, committing serious crimes against the civilians there. The RSF has also shelled Khartoum, confirming that its reach is not limited to Darfur.

127. The previous US administration concluded that “*militias have targeted fleeing civilians, murdering innocent people escaping conflict, and prevented remaining civilians from accessing lifesaving supplies*” and that “*members of the RSF and allied militias have committed genocide in Sudan*”.<sup>177</sup> More recently, in the same vein, at the UN Security Council the current US administration has called “*for accountability for the Rapid Support Forces for the genocide in Sudan*”.<sup>178</sup> Similarly, the UK has repeatedly stated that Sudan will not be forgotten.<sup>179</sup> However, these words now need to be backed by concerted actions designed to protect the civilian population. Such steps must include the following.

#### Enforcing the Arms Embargo

128. Weapons and munitions continue to flow into Sudan and to the RSF in Darfur in particular, which are then used to commit crimes against the civilian population. Urgent, meaningful action must be taken to prevent the RSF from re-arming.

129. The UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo on Darfur in 2004, which has been extended annually since. Transferring weapons and munitions into Darfur is therefore already unlawful – and has been unlawful throughout the current conflict. Investigations, including by the UN Panel of Experts and in reports cited above, continue to conclude that the RSF is able to obtain new weapons, ammunition and equipment including technologically advanced weapons systems. For instance, the RSF was able to obtain drones to deploy in the recent attack on Port Sudan which the evidence suggests were manufactured

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<sup>177</sup> <https://2021-2025.state.gov/genocide-determination-in-sudan-and-imposing-accountability-measures/>

<sup>178</sup> <https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-at-a-un-security-council-briefing-on-sudan-and-the-icc/>

<sup>179</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/sudan-must-not-be-forgotten-david-lammy-announces-political-and-humanitarian-action-to-address-catastrophe-in-sudan>

in China and re-exported to the RSF by the UAE. Better enforcement is therefore required to stop the flow of arms into Sudan.

130. There is a credible body of evidence identifying that the supply routes for the RSF include an air bridge from the UAE to Am Djarass airport in Chad, from which small convoys can cross the border into Darfur, and land convoys through Libya into Darfur. NGOs have identified munitions and equipment linked to the UAE in images of the RSF. Further, some of the companies involved in financing the RSF have been identified and sanctioned, including those involved in the supply of gold through the UAE and the purchase of vehicles from the UAE.

131. Immediate action is now required to enforce the existing arms embargo. That action must include measures against the external actors who are supplying or enabling the supply of weapons to the RSF – including Chad, through the use of the Am Djarass air base, and the UAE. Credible international monitoring is required at Am Djarass and at the identified supply routes across the border with Chad. Further international investigation of the front companies used by the RSF is also required to enable co-ordinated sanctions, since it is likely that the front companies are only the most visible components of a web of companies designed to funnel money and supplies to the RSF. It is not sufficient only to apply sanctions to the parent companies, a more thorough assessment of all of the companies involved at different levels of the supply chain and different financial activities is required, including in relation to companies located outside of Sudan in the UAE and elsewhere.

#### Targeted Sanctions

132. The UK must make much more effective use of the applicable sanctions regime in order to prevent the ongoing crimes. It is striking that since the conflict resumed in April 2023, the UK has only updated its sanctions on individuals to include two members of the RSF (and then when required to do so by the UN sanctions body) and two members of the Wagner Group. The US has also sanctioned other leaders of the RSF including Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, Algoni Hamdan Daglo Musa, Ali Yaqoub Gibril and Abdulrahim Hamdan Dagalo.



133. The UK's sanctions regime would permit the imposition of sanctions on the RSF leadership and those linked to it. The Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020 provide the Secretary of State with the discretion to designate persons involved in activities which would amount to a serious violation of the right to life or the right to freedom from torture. The definition of involved persons in Regulation 6(3)(d) is broad enough to cover not only the RSF leadership but all those who make available funds, economic resources, goods or technology to such activities. Sanctions may include asset freezing and travel restrictions, in addition to their important declaratory effect.

134. The UK sanctions regime is designed precisely to enable sanctions to be imposed on individuals linked to serious international crimes and human rights violations, as the UK has done in relation to other countries including Myanmar and China.<sup>180</sup>

135. The widespread and systemic crimes committed by the RSF in Sudan over a sustained period of time, together with their broad reporting in the media and by reputable NGOs, makes it inconceivable that the RSF leadership is not, as a minimum, aware of the crimes. The UK must therefore consider imposing individual sanctions on the leaders of the RSF. The UK should immediately publicly explain why it has not sanctioned the commander of the RSF - Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo. The UK should co-ordinate its sanctions so that they are consistent with those imposed by the US and other States. Following credible reports identifying the commanders controlling the RSF offensive on El Fasher, co-ordinated sanctions should be imposed on those individuals.<sup>181</sup>

### *Ending the Conflict*

136. Whilst convening the London conference in April 2025 was a welcome sign of the UK's engagement, it is unfortunately clear that the conference was ineffective. Not only did it fail to agree to a joint communique, but the RSF chose

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<sup>180</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-sanctions-perpetrators-of-gross-human-rights-violations-in-xinjiang-alongside-eu-canada-and-us>

<sup>181</sup> <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/239>, para.40.

to defy the international negotiations by announcing its parallel administration in Sudan on the very day of the conference.

137. The failure of the London conference demonstrates that it will not be possible to resolve the conflict in Sudan in a single meeting, but that a lasting peace will require sustained engagement by key States and institutions.

138. Lessons must be learned from the London conference to guide the future conduct of negotiations. A resolution of the situation in Sudan cannot be imposed from outside Sudan without engaging with the key parties to the conflict.

139. Future internationally sponsored negotiations should not legitimise States involved in arming the parties, in breach of the arms embargo. The UN Panel of Experts and NGOs have noted extensive, credible evidence of the UAE's involvement in arming the RSF.

140. The rights of civilians must be protected in any future agreement to the conflict. Furthermore, decades of evidence from all over the world shows that involving civil society in negotiations makes peace agreements far more likely to succeed. Women's participation increases the probability of a peace agreement lasting at least two years by 20 percent, and by 35 percent the probability of a peace agreement lasting 15 years.<sup>182</sup>

#### Accountability and Justice

141. Survivors of the conflict, and relatives of victims, insist that any resolution of the conflict must have regard to their right to truth and justice. Past failure to achieve true accountability for crimes in Darfur have contributed significantly to the RSF's sense of impunity.

142. The ICC's investigation into the situation in Darfur is ongoing. As a result of the referral by the UN Security Council in Resolution 1593/2005, the ICC has

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<sup>182</sup> <https://wps.unwomen.org/participation/>

jurisdiction over international crimes committed in Darfur from 1 July 2002.<sup>183</sup> The ICC's jurisdiction is ongoing, since the Security Council has not set an end-date to its referral and since there is a clear nexus between the crimes now being committed in Darfur and the situation which was referred in 2005. On 28 January 2025, the Prosecutor indicated that the ICC was taking necessary steps to put forward applications for warrant of arrest.<sup>184</sup> It is vital that States, particularly members of the Security Council which referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC in the first place, support the work of the ICC. In particular, all parties to the conflict, including the Government of Sudan and the RSF must take steps to co-operate with the ICC in the investigation of these crimes. Investigations should not only be directed at the RSF but also those who have supported it and are complicit in the crimes committed including the UAE.

143. The ICC cannot, however, bring accountability and justice to Sudan on its own. It has no jurisdiction over crimes committed outside Darfur and it lacks the capacity to address all the perpetrators of the crimes which are currently being committed. It is therefore imperative that States investigate the crimes themselves making full use of universal jurisdiction. States may exercise jurisdiction over the crime of genocide under Article 6 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This must be understood to include not merely those who commit genocide, but also those who conspire to commit genocide or are complicit in genocide.<sup>185</sup> The national investigations should therefore cover not only the leadership of the RSF, but also individuals in States such as the UAE who may be complicit in the crime of genocide through funding, supplying and supporting the RSF.

144. States must press and publicly commit to extend and re-inforce the mandates of all current investigative mechanisms, including the Panel of Experts and UN HRC Fact Finding Mission. All parties to the conflict must allow these mechanisms to have access to Sudan.

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<sup>183</sup> <https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/N0529273.pdf>

<sup>184</sup> <https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-karim-aa-khan-kc-united-nations-security-council-situation-darfur#:~:text=There%20have%2C%20with%20respect%2C%20in,prioritisation%20of%20requests%20for%20assistance.>

<sup>185</sup> *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*, Article 3.

Protecting Survivors

145. There is no doubt that the conflict in Sudan has caused a staggering humanitarian crisis. Vast numbers of civilians have been displaced into terrible conditions. Many have been subjected to crimes of violence, including and sexual violence. Targeted action is required to protect them.
146. First, the US, the UK and others should ensure that comprehensive measures are put in place to ensure that aid is able to reach the victims who are in need. The reports summarised above confirm that the RSF is preventing aid from reaching the vulnerable in El Fasher and its attacks on IDP camps has forced the withdrawal of humanitarian NGOs such as the RSF. An earlier priority in any peace negotiations must be that all parties to the conflict allow unrestricted access to humanitarian agencies.
147. Second, the US, the UK and others must enable targeted assistance to the most vulnerable. A distressing feature of the crimes committed by the RSF is the prevalence of sexual crimes against women and girls, and crimes against children. The effects of these crimes are magnified by the attacks on civilian infrastructure; the medical capacity to assist victims of sexual violence, or even to provide basic maternity care, is severely limited by the attacks on hospitals. The survivors of these crimes need immediate access to healthcare in order to provide treatment for their injuries and sexual health. The provision of psychological intervention and trauma services is also essential.

## **ABOUT THE AUTHOR**

Dr Brian Dooley is an independent human rights expert and has prepared this report in that capacity. He is a Senior Advisor at US-based international NGO Human Rights First and works with human rights activists in hostile environments.

He is an Honorary Professor of Practice at The Mitchell Institute for Global Peace, Security and Justice at Queen's University, Belfast, and a Visiting Scholar at the Global Governance Unit at University College, London. He is a former Visiting Scholar at both the John Jay College of Criminal Justice at the City University and at Fordham University's Law School in New York.

For several years, Brian Dooley has also worked with international NGOs including Amnesty International focusing on partnering with national NGOs in the global South. He also served as the Head of Media at Amnesty International.

From April 2020 to March 2023, he was Senior Advisor to Mary Lawlor, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders. Lawlor paid tribute to his role in "*assisting me to develop my working methods for the Mandate and to identify the best ways to engage with States*" and acknowledged his "*huge contribution*" to her report on the achievements of human rights defenders, presented at the United Nations.

Dr Dooley speaks regularly on human rights issues at national parliaments and United Nations forums. He writes for the international press on Middle East affairs, including reporting on human rights violations in the United Arab Emirates.