By Part 2/2
Continuing from the previous part, to identify the locations of meetings and movements of the rebel militia leader, we must consider several points—some of which we highlight here.
First: The presence around Hemedti during the rally in South Darfur included leaders and mobilized forces. Specifically, militia leader Idris Hassan and Habeeb Hareeka—both from South Darfur. The first had addressed the same forces a week earlier, while the second is one of the commanders who did not participate in the Kordofan operations and has now been assigned a new mission, which we will discuss, God willing.
Second: Key takeaways from Hemedti’s speech focus on two points: his attempt to reassure the Arab Republic of Egypt and the citizens of Northern and River Nile States, saying “Our forces don’t include looters.” This indirectly indicates that this force’s objective is to attack the River Nile and Northern States. The operation is led by Habeeb Hareeka and personally overseen by Hemedti himself. Consequently, his movements are believed to be between Umm Al-Qura in South Darfur, Khor Baranga, possibly Al-Malha, or toward Al-Hamra and Umm Badir.
Can Hemedti execute his plans—i.e., an attack on River Nile and Northern States? This question allows for hypotheses and general observations:
- On the leadership level: Hemedti is an impulsive and obsessive man, seeking to reclaim lost glory. His options are limited, and his decisions are based on specific operational conditions, as seen in his 2023 attacks and especially his 2024 assault on Madani (the soft underbelly of Al-Jazirah State). That offensive included movement along multiple axes, with high-intensity firepower and the use of three critical elements from previous battles: drone swarms, activation of internal sleeper cells to destabilize the home front, and spreading rumors to induce panic.
- Second point: the field commanders. According to indicators, they are Idris Hassan and Habeeb Hareeka. Both have suffered defeats despite being well-equipped and experienced. Idris was the commander of the East Nile and Bahri sectors, commanding over 8,000 militia fighters with significant equipment and operational capacity. He held areas of control but was defeated in three of the RSF’s greatest losses—at the Jili refinery, the Soba Bridge, and the disgraceful retreat from East Nile in general. He fled to Salha in March 2025 and from there to Khor Baranga in West Darfur.
As for Hareeka, he was sent to rescue those besieged at the state radio station, where he extracted members of the Mahariya tribe and left the others to their fate. He remained the RSF commander in Omdurman but never breached the defenses of the military engineers for two years.
- Third point: numerical strength. According to available images, the force involved in the rally does not exceed 3,000 troops—perhaps 5,000 at most. Still, this could be misleading, as the RSF has relocated forces to the tri-border area, Raheb, Karab Al-Toum, and the Chevrolet base—not to mention their forces in Al-Malha. They also have troops in Al-Hamra, Umm Badir, Bara, Khouli Al-Khuwai, and Al-Nuhud.
Idris Hassan once claimed they had 12 operational units. In reality, they likely don’t have that capability, but one could say they’re attempting maneuvers in different regions. This includes Abdelrahim’s leadership of the offensive on El Fasher.
While the political leadership and armed movements are preoccupied with power-sharing, the militia leader is planning to disrupt the scene by launching an assault on the River Nile and Northern States.
This is, by all analytical standards, a desperate move based on outdated calculations. There have been many developments in military arrangements, preparedness, and armament.
Certainly, the military leadership has its own data and calculations—but public awareness and the vigilance of community and tribal leaders remain critical.
Hemedti’s recklessness will taste bitter, God willing.
May God protect the country and its people.
Dr. Ibrahim Al-Siddiq Ali
June 23, 2025